

Название публикации:

Determinants of cartel collusion of participants in public procurement

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Аннотация:

The paper shows that one of the most important problems that creates barriers to increasing the number of companies that hamper the improvement of quality and reduce prices for products are punitive conspiracies of participants in the placement of state (municipal) procurement. It is shown that, for participants in the placement of state and municipal orders, cartel collusion is the most optimal strategy of behavior. Based on the analysis of the practice of state and municipal purchases in the Russian Federation, the factors of cartel collusion between participants in the auctions were singled out and disclosed. The work noted that the identification, analysis and monitoring of factors coordinated actions of participants in the placement of state orders will increase the effectiveness of antimonopoly control. © IAEME Publication

Ключевые слова:

"Prisoner's Problem", Cartel, Collusion, Determinant, Public Procurement